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Abstract
In this paper we test whether the co-movement of sovereign CDS premia in-
creased significantly after the Greek debt crisis started in October 2009. We
perform a bivariate test for contagion that is based on an approach proposed
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Our sample consists of daily data between
October 2008 and July 2010 for 39 countries including both emerging and
industrialized countries. Our results indicate that there were periods of con-
tagion for CDS markets during the Greek debt crisis, which is in contrast
to the results from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for equity markets after the
Hong Kong crash and their conclusion of “no contagion, only interdepen-
dence”. Especially for European countries we would instead conclude “both
contagion and interdependence”.
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2
“Nothing is so well calculated to produce a death-like tor-
por in the country as an extended system of taxation and
a great national debt.”
William Cobbett, letter, Feb. 10, 1804
3
1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2008 the sovereign CDS market in Europe has
been growing strongly. The financial crisis caused public deficits to increase
massively due to fiscal stimulus packages, bail-outs and reduced tax rev-
enues. As can be seen in Figure 1, however, the trend of increasing public
debt had started already in the 1970s. For instance, the average debt-to-
GDP ratio for the G7 countries had risen from a low of about 30% to around
90% in 2007. Since then, the debt-to-GDP has increased by another 20 per-
centage points.
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Figure 1: Debt-to-GDP Ratio since 1950. Source: IMF.
Accordingly, fears about the sustainability of this development, accompa-
nied by deteriorating credit quality for some countries, stimulated the needs
of market participants to hedge against sovereign default risk. Eventually,
this led to a significant increase in the demand for sovereign credit default
swaps (CDS). Prior to 2008, sovereign CDS were mainly traded for emerging
markets. However, since then CDS markets for industrialized countries have
also been developed and have been in the limelight several times. According
to the Fitch Solutions liquidity index1, the liquidity in European sovereign
CDS surpassed the liquidity of Latin American emerging economies in sev-
eral periods after November 2009. In general, as stated by Markit, the
liquidity of a credit derivative asset increases when the underlying is show-
1As stated by Fitch Solutions, the liquidity index measures “are derived from a proprietary
statistical model which produces a liquidity score for each credit derivative asset by
modeling a broad set of information taken from the CDS market.”
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ing signs of financial stress in combination with a significant amount of debt
outstanding and/or changes in its capital structure, including new issuance.2
Entities also tend to be more liquid when there is agreement about present
value but disagreement about future value due to heightened uncertainty
surrounding the entity.
As discussed in Andenmatten and Brill (2011), CDS are bilateral con-
tracts used to transfer risk among market participants and are basically
defined by four parameters: the reference entity, the notional amount, the
price (spread or premium), and the maturity. One participant is the so-
called protection buyer who wants to buy insurance against the default of a
specific entity, the so-called reference entity. The other party is the protec-
tion seller, who writes the insurance on the reference entity. To compensate
the seller of the insurance for the assumed risk, the protection buyer pays
an initially fixed spread every year (or each quarter) on the insured notional
value. If a credit event occurs, the CDS is triggered and the protection seller
has to pay the di!erence between the insured notional value and the recovery
value.3 Since 2005, an auction process has been instituted and settlement is
almost always made through an auction (either cash or physical delivery),
i.e. investors are signed up automatically for all auctions.
A CDS makes it possible to invest in the credit quality of a corporate
or a sovereign. If an investor believes that the credit quality of a corporate
will decrease in the coming months and that this is not yet priced into
the current spreads, he should buy protection. Once the spreads widen,
he will profit because his insurance will increase in value. He can close the
insurance contract whenever he wants and monetize his gains. Thus, buying
protection on Germany does not mean that somebody is speculating on the
country going bankrupt. It merely means that somebody believes the credit
quality of Germany will decrease in the future. At the same time, the seller
of the protection on Germany believes that – given the current spreads – it
is attractive to agree to the contract.
The so-called PIGS countries (i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) have
been frequently in the focus of financial markets and the media, especially
since October 2009 when Greek o"cials announced that debt statistics had
been forged. As a consequence, financial market participants responded
quickly to the deterioration in fiscal positions by requiring higher sovereign
default risk premia not only for Greece but also for many other countries with
a seemingly unsustainable fiscal situation. This supports previous studies
that had shown that sovereign risk premium di!erentials tend to co-move
over time and are mainly driven by a common time-varying factor, which
2Interestingly, CDS liquidity for France, Spain and Portugal has consistently been greater
than that of Ireland.
3The so-called ISDA Credit Derivative Determination Committee – consisting of buy and
sell side members – will decide whether the requirements for a credit event are fulfilled.
The decision of the determination committee is binding for the whole market.
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can be interpreted as a repricing of global risk factors (see for instance
Codogno, Favero, & Missale, 2003; Favero, Pagano, & Thadden, 2007; and
Geyer, Kossmeier, & Pichler, 2004).
In line with that, in an extensive study of 26 developed and emerging-
market countries Longsta!, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) find for
the period 2000-2007 that sovereign credit risk premia were generally more
related to the U.S. stock market and high-yield bond markets, global risk
premia, and capital flows than they were to local factors. Accordingly, an
investment in sovereign credit is to a large extent a compensation for bearing
global risk and there is little or no country specific premium. However, their
study does not include a sovereign debt crisis or the sort of credit events we
experienced in the 1990s.
In contrast, Sgherri and Zoli (2009) find evidence that since October 2008
markets have become progressively more concerned about the potential fiscal
implications of national financial sectors’ frailty and future debt dynamics,
which would imply that sovereign credit risk premia are driven more by
national than global factors.
The recent focus of financial market participants on the fiscal situation
in the PIGS countries provides an opportunity to study the developments
of CDS premia for “hot-spot” countries. We now have a better data basis
for studying the co-movement of CDS premia across countries and regions
and testing whether the co-movement of sovereign CDS premia increased
significantly after the Greek debt crisis that started in October 2009 – a
development which is usually referred to as contagion. However, there does
not seem to be any agreement on what contagion exactly means (Rigobon,
2002) and how it manifests itself. For instance, Forbes and Rigobon (2001)
declare that “there is no consensus on exactly what constitutes contagion or
how it should be defined”. In the following analysis, we will define contagion
in the restrictive way proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They define
contagion as a significant increase in cross market linkages after a shock to
one country.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows: In the next section,
we discuss the concept of contagion and describe a bivariate test procedure
that was originally proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). In section 3, we
apply this test procedure to our sample of daily data between October 2008
and July 2010 for 39 countries including both emerging and industrialized
countries. In doing so, we test for contagion stemming from the Greek CDS
market (country level analysis) and the regional CDS market for the PIGS
countries (regional level analysis), respectively. In section 4, we attempt to
explore the common factor and perform first principal component analysis
in order to analyze the degree of commonality of inner-regional variation of
CDS premia. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2 Propagation of Shocks: Contagion vs. Interde-
pendence
On October 4, 2009, George Papandreou became the new prime minister
of Greece after his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) party won
the general election. At that time, the Greek economy was still faced with
the severe repercussions of the financial crisis. Around two weeks later, on
October 20, o"cials from the new government announced that Greek debt
statistics had been forged in the past. Instead of a public deficit of 6% of
GDP for 2009 the government now expected twice as much to materialize.
This was the starting point of the Greek debt crisis that led to radical aus-
terity packages for the Greek economy and an international rescue package.
The crisis also led to a strong increase in risk premia for Greek sovereign
debt as reflected, for instance, in CDS premia. While the CDS premium for
a Greek government bond with a 5-year maturity and a notional value of
USD 10 million was 124 basis points on October 20, 2009, it soared to 1012
basis points by May 7, 2010. This means that the insurance costs against
a default of this particular Greek government bond increased by a factor of
more than 8 times, i.e. from USD 124,000 to more than USD 1 million. At
the same time, CDS premia for many other countries increased strongly as
well. Figure 2 illustrates this by comparing the development of the CDS
premia for the PIGS countries. As can be seen, the increase for Greek CDS
premia was strongest, but these dramatic movements were mirrored in the
other three CDS markets as well.
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Figure 2: CDS Premia in Basis Points. Source: Thomson Reuters.
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This shows that dramatic events in one market can have strong im-
pacts on other markets. The question then is whether a high degree of
co-movement during times of crisis already constitutes contagion? Or does
this, as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue, rather reflect the fact that global
markets are “so interdependent that they have similar high rates of co-
movement in all states of the world?” Before we can discuss these questions
for the Greek debt crisis in section 3, we first introduce the theoretical frame-
work of what contagion constitutes as well as an empirical test procedure
based on the approach from Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
2.1 Theory and Literature Review
According to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), reasons for contagion
can be divided into two groups: on the one hand fundamental based reasons
and on the other hand investor behavior-based reasons. While fundamental
based contagion works through real and financial linkages across countries,
behavior based contagion is more sentiment driven. It seems reasonable to
assume that during a financial crisis both types of contagion are present:
Firstly, fundamental based because of the strong interrelationship of finan-
cial sectors. For instance, during the Greek debt crisis it became apparent
that European banks had a significant exposure to Greek government bonds.
Hence, a potential restructuring of Greek bonds increased the probability
of bail-out packages in di!erent European countries. Secondly, as discussed
in Dornbusch et al. (2000), investor behavior-based contagion usually takes
e!ect through liquidity and incentive problems, as well as information asym-
metries and coordination problems. As Dornbusch et al. (2000) stated:
In the absence of better information to the contrary, investors
may believe that a financial crisis in one country could lead to
similar crises in other countries. A crisis in one country may
then induce an attack on the currencies of other countries in
which conditions are similar. This type of behavior can reflect
rational as well as irrational behavior. If a crisis reflects and re-
veals weak fundamentals, investors may rationally conclude that
similarly situated countries are also likely to face such problems;
such reasoning helps explain how crises become contagious. This
channel presumes, of course, that investors are imperfectly in-
formed about each country’s true characteristics and thus make
decisions on the basis of some known indicators, including those
revealed in other countries, which may or may not reflect the true
state of the subject country’s vulnerabilities. The information
investors use may include the actions of other investors, which
brings us to the e!ects of informational asymmetries on investor
behavior.
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There is an extensive literature on potential reasons and transmission
channels of contagion4 as well as on theoretical modeling of contagion.5
However, little is yet known about the transmission channels and their rel-
ative importance.
In addition to that, there is also a large body of literature that focuses
on empirical tests for the existence of contagion in a certain stress period,
i.e. if there are stronger cross-market linkages in times of crisis. This study
belongs to the latter type. In what follows, we will focus on testing for the
existence of contagion during the Greek debt crisis.
So far, however, no unifying framework of testing for the existence of
contagion during financial crises has been agreed upon. Instead, a broad
range of di!erent methodologies has been developed. Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-
Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) o!er an extensive review of these method-
ologies as well as their empirical application for equity markets in 1997-98
during the Asian crisis.6 According to the authors of this study, the fact
that there are so many di!erent methodologies in use makes the assessment
of contagion di"cult. This seems to be particularly the case for assessing
the significance in transmitting crises between countries.
In what follows, we focus on the approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
which builds on a correlation analysis. The motivation for focusing on this
approach is based on the above mentioned survey from Dungey et al. (2005).
In their empirical application of di!erent methodologies Dungey et al. clas-
sify the approach from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) as a conservative test
as it did not yield any evidence of contagion for equity markets during the
Asian crisis in 1997-98. Accordingly, finding evidence for contagion during
the Greek debt crisis with such a conservative test would then be a stronger
signal than finding evidence for contagion with a less conservative test.
The basic idea of this approach is to test whether the correlation be-
tween two variables increases significantly during a crisis period. However,
one has to be careful when comparing correlation coe"cients between dif-
ferent periods because, as Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1997) and Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) show, correlation coe"cients between markets are con-
ditional on volatility. Hence, during times of increased volatility (i.e. in
times of crisis) estimates of correlation coe"cients are biased upward.7 If
co-movement tests are not adjusted for that bias, contagion is too easily
detected.
4For example, see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) and Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado
(2000).
5For instance, see Allen and Gale (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Chue (2002), Kodres
and Pritsker (2002), and Kyle and Xiong (2001).
6See also Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) for an overview of the
literature.
7Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use a numerical example to show how heteroscedasticity can
bias a correlations estimator upward.
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A good example for the misleading nature of an uncorrected bias is the
paper by King and Wadhwani (1990), which was the first major analysis
focusing on co-movement analysis. Here contagion is defined as a significant
increase in the correlation coe"cient. The paper detects contagion between
international stock markets after the U.S. market crash in 1987. However, as
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show, when cross market correlation coe"cients
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity, there is no longer a significant increase
in these correlation coe"cients.
Before discussing test procedures for contagion, we first examine poten-
tial channels through which correlation between sovereign credit risk and,
hence, CDS premia could arise. According to a framework presented by
Longsta! et al. (2011) that builds on standard arbitrage arguments8 one
can distinguish between three di!erent channels.
One channel might arise through the correlation between the arrival rates
of credit events. This might be induced by a deterioration in the economic
situation of the countries in question. For example, the financial crisis of
2008 led to a severe economic slowdown around the globe, dragging many
countries into the most severe recession since World War II. In an attempt
to stimulate the economy, many governments passed huge rescue packages
at the cost of soaring public deficits. Eventually, investors have started to
question the ability of some governments to serve their debt. This could be
interpreted as an expected increase in the arrival rate of credit events for
some of the countries.
Another channel might arise through the correlation between loss rates
given a default. This could reflect a worsening of the bargaining situation
of creditors due to a deterioration of the economic situation, political tur-
moil, and legal disputes. As a consequence, governments might face higher
refinancing costs.
A third channel might arise through liquidity e!ects. This can also
be illustrated by the recent financial crisis and the flight to quality that
took place after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers (see
Longsta! (2004) for an analysis of flights to quality). Other forms of liq-
uidity e!ects might stem from higher trading costs on illiquid securities for
which investors want to be compensated (see Amihud, Mendelson, & Ped-
ersen, 2006) and from the possibility that investors are subject to margin
requirements (see Liu & Longsta!, 2004). As a consequence, these funding
problems might lead to market illiquidity (Pedersen & Brunnermeier, 2007).
8As discussed, among others, in Du"e and Singleton (1999), Dai and Singleton (2003),
and Pan and Singleton (2008).
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2.2 A Bivariate Test of Contagion
As mentioned in the previous section, correlation is conditional on volatility.
Hence, in times of stress correlation coe"cients are biased upward. Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) present a statistical correction for this conditioning bias
and the appropriate procedure to test for contagion (henceforth: FR-test),
which we discuss in this section.
We focus on two versions of the bivariate FR-test: that originally devel-
oped by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and another suggested by Dungey et
al. (2005). We base our notation on that of Dungey et al. (2005).
First, we define di!erent sample periods:
x : period before the crisis
y : crisis period
z : whole sample period
Moreover, we define the following parameters of volatility and correlation:
!2x,i : volatility of country i
"s CDS premia before the crisis (i = 1, 2)
!2y,i : volatility of country i
"s CDS premia in the crisis (i = 1, 2)
"x : correlation between countries 1 and 2 in period x
"y : correlation between countries 1 and 2 in period y
"z : correlation between countries 1 and 2 in period z
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that the standard (unadjusted) correlation
coe"cient is conditional on the variance in the two asset markets. Accord-
ingly, if there is an increase in volatility in country 1 during times of crises,
i.e. !2y,1 > !2x,1, it would be misleading to suppose contagion if "y > "x.
Hence, we have to correct for the upward bias. Forbes and Rigobon quan-
tify this bias and show that the adjusted (unconditional) correlation is given
by:9
#y =
"y!
1 + [(!2y,1 ! !2x,1)/!2x,1](1 ! "2y)
(1)
9For a similar approach see Boyer et al. (1997), Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2001),
Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2005), and Loretan and English (2000); for alternative
approaches see Karolyi and Stulz (1996), and Longin and Solnik (1995).
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As can be seen from (1), the unconditional correlation coe"cient, #y, is the
conditional correlation coe"cient, "y, scaled by a function of the change
in volatility in asset returns of the source country over the high and low
volatility periods. To illustrate this, assume that !2y,1 > !2x,1, i.e. that the
volatility of asset returns in country 1 increases from period x to period y.
Then, (!2y,1 ! !2x,1)/!2x,1 > 0 and for any "y " (!1; 1) it follows that
!
1 + [(!2y,1 ! !2x,1)/!2x,1](1 ! "2y) > 1 (2)
With that it follows that #y < "y. From (1) it is also immediately apparent
that #y = "x if there is no fundamental shift in the relationship between the
two asset markets from the low to the high volatility period.
Accordingly, we can formulate the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis, respectively, of a test that there is a significant increase in the
correlation coe"cient in the high volatility period, i.e. that there is conta-
gion, as follows:
H0 : #y = "x (3)
H1 : #y > "x (4)
We can use a t-test to test this hypothesis where the t-statistic is given by
t =
#̂y ! "̂x"
V ar(#̂y ! "̂x)
(5)
and where #̂y and "̂x mark the sample estimators of #y and "x, respectively.
If we assume that the two samples are drawn from independent normal
distributions we can transform the standard error in (5) as follows:
V ar(#̂y ! "̂x) = V ar(#̂y) + V ar("̂x) ! 2Cov(#̂y, "̂x) (6)
= V ar(#̂y) + V ar("̂x) (7)
#= (1/Ty) + (1/Tx) (8)
where Tx (Ty) is the sample size of the low (high) volatility period. To
get to (7) we use the independence assumption and (8) follows from the
assumption of normality and an asymptotic approximation.10 With that we
get
FR =
#̂y ! "̂x"
(1/Ty) + (1/Tx)
(9)
10For this asymptotic approximation Dungey et al. (2005) refer to Kendall and Stuart
(1969).
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In a next step, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest using the Fisher transfor-
mation, as this improves the finite sample properties of the test statistic.11
This yields
FR =
1/2[log((1 + #̂y)/(1 ! #̂y)) ! log((1 + "̂x)/(1 ! "̂x))]"
(1/Ty ! 3) + (1/Tx ! 3)
(10)
When applying (10) one separates the respective low and high volatility
periods from each other, i.e. the two periods do not overlap. This was
suggested by Dungey et al. (2005). However, in the original test statistic
from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for testing (3) against (4) the non-crisis
period is defined as the whole sample period z, i.e. the non-crisis and the
crisis periods overlap. Accordingly, (9) would be formulated as
FR =
#̂y ! "̂z"
(1/Ty) + (1/Tz)
(11)
and the Fisher adjusted version (10) as
FR =
1/2[log((1 + #̂y)/(1 ! #̂y)) ! log((1 + "̂z)/(1 ! "̂z))]"
(1/Ty ! 3) + (1/Tz ! 3)
(12)
As shown, the test statistics (11) and (12) build on the assumption that
the variances of #̂y and "̂z are independent. This assumption is violated,
however, if the two sample periods overlap. As a result, the covariance term
in (6) is most likely not equal to zero and the step from (6) to (7) results in a
standard error that is too large, as the negative covariance term is not taken
into account. As stated by Dungey et al. (2005), this leads to a downward
bias in the t-statistic and, hence, to fewer rejections of the null hypothesis.
Nevertheless, in what follows we will apply both versions in order to see
if this downward bias leads to fundamentally di!erent results. In terms of
notation, we will refer to the overlapping version (12) suggested by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) as FRO, and to the non-overlapping version suggested
by Dungey et al. (2005) as FRN .
11According to Dungey et al. (2005), the Fisher transformation is valid for small values of
both the unadjusted and the adjusted correlation coe"cient.
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3 Contagion during the Greek Debt Crisis
In this section, we apply both versions of the FR-test in order to test for con-
tagion during the Greek debt crisis: first, the original version (12) by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) with overlapping data (FRO); and second, the alter-
native version (10) with non-overlapping data (FRN ) suggested by Dungey
et al. (2005). We perform the tests not only on a national but also on a
regional level after constructing various regional aggregates. Our sample is
based on daily data running from October 1, 2008, through July 27, 2010.
3.1 Between Countries
Starting on the national level, Table 1 lists basic descriptive information and
the number of observations for CDS premia for 39 countries. We use CDS
premia from Thomson Reuters with a notional value of USD 10 million. All
prices are based on the standard ISDA contract for physical settlement with
a constant 5-year maturity and are expressed in basis points. As can be
seen, the average values of the CDS premia range widely across countries
and the median is lower than the mean in all 39 cases. Argentina is the
country with the highest mean of 2023 basis points, followed by Ukraine at
1718 basis points.
At the other end of the range we find Germany and the United States
with means of just 15.3 and 16.8 basis points, respectively. What is more,
both the standard deviations and minimum/maximum values indicate that
many countries experienced a strong variation in their CDS premia over
time. For example, the CDS premia for Greece range from a minimum of
59.5 basis points to a maximum of 1037.6 basis points — more than 17 times
the minimum value.
We define October 20, 2009 as the start of the crisis. On this day,
o"cials from the new government in Greece announced irregularities in the
Greek debt statistics. However, this choice is somewhat arbitrary, since the
reliability of the debt statistics was widely doubted before the irregularities
were o"cially confirmed. In general, defining an exact crisis period seems
erratic based on the myriad events surrounding the Greek debt crisis. Similar
issues were already recognized by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) during the
Asian crisis in the late nineties. When did the crisis period start? When
did it end? As Forbes and Rigobon (2002) state, there was “no single event
which acts as a clear catalyst behind this turmoil”.
To demonstrate these di"culties, we take a look at the developments
in Greece since the outbreak of the crisis and their influence on the Greek
5-year CDS. The key events are marked in Figure 3.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of CDS Premia
This table lists basic descriptive information and the number of observations for CDS
premia in our sample. We use daily CDS premia from Thomson Reuters with a constant
5-year maturity. The data run from October 1, 2008, through July 27, 2010. It is worth
mentioning that in all cases the median is lower than the mean. Argentina is the country
with both the highest mean and median, followed by Ukraine. At the other end of the
range we find Finland, Germany and the United States.
Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max.
Argentina 459 2023.4 1220.6 803.3 1536.1 4841.8
Austria 460 96.7 44.5 19.2 83.0 265.0
Belgium 459 72.2 32.1 30.0 62.8 158.0
Brazil 460 204.9 104.3 109.3 140.7 606.3
Bulgaria 460 340.4 135.2 174.5 300.6 692.7
Chile 453 129.6 68.9 48.5 94.8 310.0
China 460 111.2 57.5 57.5 82.0 284.0
Columbia 460 231.3 108.4 123.7 168.8 668.7
Denmark 458 56.8 32.7 23.2 41.9 146.0
Estonia 453 313.9 194.6 90.0 236.0 732.5
Finland 455 36.2 17.1 14.5 31.0 94.0
France 459 48.6 20.9 21.0 44.0 98.7
Germany 460 37.5 15.3 12.2 34.1 92.5
Greece 460 297.3 234.3 59.5 223.3 1037.6
Hungary 460 321.1 115.4 165.6 305.9 630.7
Indonesia 458 352.9 228.9 147.5 215.0 1240.0
Ireland 455 189.4 62.6 63.0 172.0 390.0
Israel 454 145.3 44.5 99.0 122.5 282.5
Italy 460 122.5 43.4 50.0 111.9 251.7
Japan 453 63.0 21.2 18.0 64.0 120.0
Kazakhstan 455 482.2 350.6 157.0 351.1 1634.1
Malaysia 457 145.9 79.1 69.5 105.0 500.0
Mexico 460 217.4 107.2 101.2 163.7 613.1
Netherlands 458 51.6 26.4 25.0 42.9 130.0
Peru 460 211.5 110.8 107.3 145.9 664.3
Phlippines 456 255.5 119.1 142.5 193.5 840.0
Poland 455 175.8 74.1 86.0 146.8 421.0
Portugal 460 127.0 85.8 45.0 93.5 466.5
Qatar 460 152.4 75.6 76.2 115.0 390.0
Romania 460 380.3 162.3 188.5 308.9 767.7
Russia 454 355.1 237.4 124.0 264.2 1106.0
South Korea 459 194.0 121.5 73.0 138.0 680.0
Spain 460 117.1 51.9 47.2 100.6 270.2
Sweden 457 64.3 31.8 21.0 52.2 159.0
Thailand 460 158.4 76.6 75.0 120.8 500.0
Turkey 455 276.4 126.1 155.5 208.8 835.0
UK 460 82.6 27.0 27.5 79.1 165.0
Ukraine 449 1718.0 1104.7 494.5 1363.0 5300.4
USA 443 42.9 16.8 19.7 38.8 95.0
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Budget update for 2008 deficit
EU announces EUR 750 billion safety net
S&P downgrades Greece to junk
Papandreou asks for activation of an EU/IMF aid package
EU signals willigness to intervene if bond markets freeze
EU/IMF announce EUR 110 billion bail out for Greece
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Figure 3: Greek CDS Premia and Key Events During the Greek Debt Crisis
In November 2009, Greece announced its update on the initial budget for
2008. The deficit was, as mentioned previously, more than twice as much as
in the initial budget presented in December 2008. Against the background of
spreading negative market talk, CDS spreads soared in the following weeks,
which led to increasing refinancing costs on bond markets. After a period
of reassurance, in spring 2010 the situation worsened again.
A weak bond auction in April 2010 fueled fears that bond issuing was
close to a standstill. This forced euro area leaders to signal their willingness
to support Greece in case refinancing became blocked. This announcement,
however, did not succeed in calming the markets. CDS spreads soon sky-
rocketed, forcing Papandreou to activate the EU/IMF aid package.
On April 27, S&P downgraded Greek government bonds to junk. At the
beginning of May, the EU and the IMF were forced to announce a EUR 110
billion bail-out for Greece. One week later, against the background of fur-
ther rising spreads across European peripheral countries, the EU announced
a EUR 750 billion safety net for potentially troubled states. This had a tem-
porarily calming e!ect on markets. However, doubts on the sustainability of
the bailout for the Greek economy and a general worsening outlook for the
European peripheral countries, the Greek CDS in the summer 2010 again
soared to new record levels.
This chronologically aggregated summary demonstrates the pulsating
nature of a typical crisis, where periods of reassurance and stress periods al-
ternate. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that during 2009/2010 there were
several contagious periods — not just one “enduring” period of contagion.
Based on the di"culty of defining a fixed crisis period, we suggest en-
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hancing the Forbes and Rigobon approach by applying the test on rolling
windows of periods of turmoil. In the case of the Hong Kong crash, Forbes
and Rigobon defined the period of relative stability as lasting almost 22
months, namely from January 1, 1996 to October 16, 1997, and the period
of turmoil as the month starting on October 17, 1997. As discussed earlier,
we put the start of the Greek debt crisis at October 20, 2009. Accordingly,
our period of relative stability lasts from January 1, 2008 to October 19,
2009, i.e. also almost 22 months. However, the period of turmoil might
have lasted from October 20, 2009 to the end of our sample, namely July
27, 2010. But even then, one might argue, the debt crisis has not come to
an end – as the events in Ireland demonstrate. Instead, the discussion of
key events above illustrates that the period after October 20, 2009 can be
divided into various sub-periods of relative turmoil and periods of relative
calm. But even accounting for this makes it almost impossible to accurately
define fixed periods of turmoil. Therefore, we define rolling windows of rel-
ative turmoil lasting 20, 40, and 60 days, respectively. The 20-day window
corresponds to the 1-month period of relative turmoil defined by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) as 20 business days are a common proxy for a calendar
month. The 40-day and 60-day windows account for the long-lasting nature
of the Greek debt crisis.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the Rolling FR-Test Approach
Before applying the tests, we calculate first di!erences, i.e. daily changes,
of all variables in order to transform the time series into stationary ones.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests confirm that the variables in first di!erences
are all stationary. Also, as is common practice when testing for contagion, we
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calculate 2-day-moving averages of the daily changes in the CDS premia.12
This accounts for the problem that financial markets in di!erent countries
are not open at the same time.
We then apply both versions of the FR-test on rolling crisis-windows:
first, the original version with overlapping data (FRO); and second, the
alternative version with non-overlapping data (FRN ) suggested by Dungey
et al. (2005). For every single crisis window we test for contagion on a five-
percent level of significance and count the number of such signals over the
test period. Figure 4 illustrates this.
However, for identifying the signals, we cannot rely on the critical t-
values of a standard one-sided t-test. Similar to testing for a structural
break at an unknown break date, where the so-called sup F-statistic13 is the
largest of many F-statistics and, hence, its distribution is not the same as
an individual F-statistic, the distribution of the FR-test statistic is not the
same as the standard t-distribution. Based on this, we used Monte Carlo
methods to find approximate critical t-values.14 The results are shown in
table 6 in Appendix A. As can be seen, the critical values for the FR-tests
are larger than the one for a standard one-sided t-test.
Table 2 reports the number of signals for contagion stemming from the
Greek CDS market based on the transferred variables and the rolling-window
approach. As can be seen, we obtain signals for contagion for both versions
of the FR-test as well as for the three di!erent time windows, if we use the
critical values from table 6. We obtain the largest number of signals, namely
for 26 out of 38 cases, for the overlapping test, FRO, for the 20-day window.
If we focus on the relative frequency of the signals across countries we find
that European countries dominate. For instance, for Spain, Portugal, and
Ireland, we get 23, 15, and 12 signals, respectively. However, it is not only
the CDS markets of the PIGS countries that seem to be a!ected by contagion
stemming from the Greek market, but also the CDS markets of Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Austria. Outside the European Union,
we obtain most signals for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Russia. In Latin America, the number of signals
is on average much lower. For Asian countries, we get only a few signals on
average and for some countries such as South Korea and the Philippines no
signals at all.
12For instance, see Corsetti et al. (2001), Dungey et al. (2005), and Forbes and Rigobon
(2002).
13The term sup F-test is only one of many di!erent ones that are in use for this approach.
The idea was originally proposed by Quandt (1960) and, accordingly, the approach is
often called the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) test. Another term in use is sup-Wald
test. For an introduction to this approach, the interested reader is referred to Stock
and Watson (2007). For more details, Perron (2005) o!ers a review of the literature on
dealing with structural breaks.
14We describe the applied methodology in more detail in Appendix A.
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If we focus on the 40-day and 60-day windows, we find that the number
of signals decreases across countries but the regional pattern seems to be
similar to the 20-day window. With the exceptions of Kazakhstan and
Qatar, we find that the signals almost completely break down for countries
outside the European Union. Accordingly, one conclusion to draw from the
FRO-test is that we not only find evidence for contagion stemming from
the Greek CDS market but also a strong regional pattern. This observation
holds true for the FRN -test as well if we focus on the 20-day window. The
FRN -test seems to be more restrictive compared to the FRO-test, as the
number of countries for which we obtain at least one signal decreases from
26 to 14, and the average number of signals for countries with at least one
signal declines from 8.5 to 7.4. As discussed in the previous section, this had
to be expected as the standard errors of the FRO-test are likely to be biased
upward due to the overlapping nature of the periods of relative turmoil and
relative stability. This becomes even more apparent if we concentrate on
the 40-day and 60-day windows. For instance, for the 60-day window the
FRN -test only yields signals for 3 countries while the FRO yields signals
for 15 countries.
Overall, our results for CDS markets during the Greek debt crisis con-
trast with the results from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for equity markets
after the Hong Kong crash and their conclusion of “no contagion, only inter-
dependence”. With the term “interdependence”, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
refer to a situation where there is no significant increase in the adjusted
correlation coe"cient between two markets but a continued high level of co-
movement. In their view, this “continued high level of market co-movement
suggests strong real linkages between the two economies”. Especially for
European countries we would instead conclude “both contagion and inter-
dependence”. It seems that during the Greek debt crisis there were not only
periods of interdependence but also periods which were characterized by a
significant increase in the co-movement of sovereign credit risk as measured
in CDS premia. This is especially interesting as the approach of Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) is, according to Dungey et al. (2005), a conservative
test. Their findings are based on a comparison of various contagion tests
during the Asian crisis. What is more, even Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
state that their result is “controversial”. We think that finding evidence for
contagion for such a restrictive and, hence, controversial test is a very strong
result. One underlying reason for finding evidence for contagion for CDS
markets during the Greek debt crisis might be that the developments af-
ter the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers had demonstrated
how interconnected financial markets and the world economy are nowadays.
Accordingly, the risk of Greece becoming a new “Lehman” might have led
to contagion rather than just interdependence.
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Table 2
Forbes and Rigobon Tests
This table reports the number of signals for contagion stemming from the Greek CDS
market based on the bivariate Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach. We test for rolling
crisis-period windows starting on October 20, 2009. Thereby, we apply two version of
the test. First, the original version with overlapping data (FRO). Second, an alternative
version with non-overlapping data (FRN) suggested by Dungey et al. (2005). The signals
are based on a five-percent level of significance where we use the approximated critical
values from table 6.
FRO FRN
20 days 40 days 60 days 20 days 40 days 60 days
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 21 12 1 17 3 0
Belgium 6 4 6 6 0 0
Brazil 4 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chile 3 0 0 0 0 0
China 0 0 0 0 0 0
Columbia 4 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 10 6 7 7 3 4
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 6 3 3 3 0 0
France 7 9 10 5 5 5
Germany 15 15 15 6 2 3
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 3 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 12 13 2 1 1 0
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 22 3 0 21 2 0
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 18 27 17 5 13 0
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 4 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 19 7 8 9 0 0
Peru 4 0 0 0 0 0
Phlippines 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 2 3 9 0 0 0
Portugal 15 2 0 9 0 0
Qatar 3 4 4 0 0 0
Romania 0 5 0 0 0 0
Russia 5 5 5 1 0 0
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 23 6 0 13 3 0
Sweden 4 5 6 0 0 0
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 5 2 3 0 0 0
UK 1 0 0 1 0 0
Ukraine 1 0 0 0 0 0
USA 4 4 4 0 0 0
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3.2 Between Regions
Motivated by the regional pattern of contagion signals we found in the pre-
vious section, we also aim to test for contagion on a regional level. We base
our analysis on the findings of Longsta! et al. (2011), who performed a clus-
ter analysis to identify significant commonality in sovereign credit spreads
on an aggregated level. However, in contrast to Longsta! et al. (2011), we
do not construct clusters ex post based on the pairwise correlations in our
sample. Instead, we construct ex ante regional aggregates. The motivation
of this approach is threefold. First, our data sample covers more countries
from various regions than the one in Longsta! et al. (2011). Also, our sample
is more balanced between industrial and emerging countries. While in the
sample of Longsta! et al. (2011) Japan is the only industrialized country out
of 26 countries, in our sample 17 out of 39 countries are industrialized. This
allows us to construct a broad range of both geographical and political ag-
gregates. Second, Longsta! et al. (2011) find that there is a strong regional
structure in their cluster analysis. In particular, the first cluster is domi-
nated by Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, the second one by Asian
countries, the third one again by Eastern Europe, the fourth one by Latin
America, and the sixth one by the Middle East. Thus it seems plausible to
construct aggregates along regional lines. Finally, the focus of investors dur-
ing the Greek debt crisis first on the PIGS countries and later on the euro
area as a whole indicates a strong interest in particular aggregates which we
would like to address directly.
Accordingly, we construct various aggregates based both on geographical
and political criteria. These aggregates are constructed as unweighted aver-
ages of CDS premia of countries belonging to the selected region. Table 3
gives an overview of these aggregates and the countries that were included for
constructing them. The aggregates are the following: the European Union
(EU), the European Monetary Union (EMU), the PIGS countries, Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Middle East (ME), Asia, Latin America
(LATAM), and an aggregate for the USA, Japan, and Germany (G3).
Based on the national-level approach, we calculate first daily changes of
the regional aggregates and then 2-day-moving averages. Panel A of Table
4 reports correlation coe"cients between the CDS premia in first di!erences
of the regional aggregates for the whole sample. We excluded the PIGS
countries for the regional aggregates of the EU, the EMU, and the world
aggregate. In general, one can see that the pairwise correlation coe"cients
between most regional aggregates are very high. For instance, correlation
coe"cients for the EU range from 0.68 with Asia to 0.87 with the world
aggregate.
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Table 3
Definition of Regional Aggregates
This table gives an overview about the regional aggregates and the countries that were
included for constructing the aggregates. EU stands for European Union; EMU for the
European Monetary Union; PIGS for Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain; CEE for
Central and Eastern Europe; ME for Middle East; LATAM for Latin America; and G3
for USA, Japan, and Germany.
EU EMU PIGS CEE ME Asia LATAM G3
Argentina x
Austria x x
Belgium x x
Brazil x
Bulgaria x x
Chile x
China x
Columbia x
Denmark x
Estonia x x
Finland x x
France x x
Germany x x x
Greece x x x
Hungary x x
Indonesia x
Ireland x x x
Israel x
Italy x x
Japan x
Kazakhstan x
Malaysia x
Mexico x
Netherlands x x
Peru x
Phlippines x
Poland x x
Portugal x x x
Qatar x
Romania x x
Russia x
South Korea x
Spain x x x
Sweden x
Thailand x
Turkey x
UK x
Ukraine x
USA x
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Table 4
Correlation Coe"cients and Contagion Signals for Regional Aggregates
Panel A reports correlation coe"cients between the CDS premia in first di!erences of
selected regional aggregates for the whole sample. The regional aggregates are constructed
as unweighted averages of CDS premia of countries belonging to the selected region. EU
stands for European Union (ex PIGS countries); EMU for the European Monetary Union
(ex PIGS countries); PIGS for Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain; CEE for Central and
Eastern Europe; ME for Middle East; LATAM for Latin America; G3 for USA, Japan,
and Germany; and World for the world aggregate (ex PIGS countries).
Panel A: Correlation Coe"cients for the Whole Sample Period
EU EMU PIGS CEE ME Asia LATAM G3 World
EU 1.00
EMU 0.74 1.00
PIGS 0.68 0.86 1.00
CEE 0.90 0.59 0.53 1.00
ME 0.79 0.59 0.53 0.82 1.00
Asia 0.68 0.61 0.53 0.65 0.76 1.00
LATAM 0.63 0.57 0.51 0.62 0.63 0.68 1.00
G3 0.66 0.80 0.68 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.50 1.00
World 0.87 0.73 0.66 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.71 1.00
Panel B reports the number of signals for contagion stemming from the PIGS aggregate
based on the bivariate Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach. We test for rolling crisis-
period windows starting on October 20, 2009. Thereby, we apply two version of the test.
First, the original version with overlapping data (FRO). Second, an alternative version
with non-overlapping data (FRN) suggested by Dungey et al. (2005). The signals are
based on a five-percent level of significance where we use the approximated critical values
from table 6.
Panel B: Signals for Contagion Stemming from the PIGS Aggregate
FRO FRN
20 days 40 days 60 days 20 days 40 days 60 days
EU 42 57 73 39 53 70
EMU 15 5 7 8 0 2
CEE 0 5 0 1 4 0
ME 21 23 8 18 11 0
Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0
LATAM 0 0 0 0 0 0
G3 0 0 0 0 0 0
World 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Panel B of Table 4 reports the number of signals for contagion stemming
from the PIGS aggregate based on the same approach as on the national
level. Accordingly, we test for rolling crisis-period windows starting on Oc-
tober 20, 2009. We apply both versions of the FR-test: first, the original
version with overlapping data (FRO); and second, the alternative version
with non-overlapping data (FRN ) suggested by Dungey et al. (2005). The
signals are based on a five-percent level of significance where we use the
approximated critical values from table 6.
As can be seen, we also obtain many signals for contagion on the regional
level. The regional pattern we found on the national level seems to be
confirmed by the regional analysis. While the European aggregates produce
the largest number of signals for both versions of the test as well as for
the di!erent time windows, the tests also return signals for Central and
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In contrast, we find neither evidence
of contagion for Latin America nor for Asia.
If we further compare the results of the regional analysis with those of
the national level, we find that the FRN is again more restrictive except for
the EU aggregate.
Overall, the regional analysis supports the findings of the analysis on
the national level. For Europe in particular, we can again conclude that
there was “both contagion and interdependence” stemming from the PIGS
countries. To our knowledge, testing for contagion with regional aggregates
is a fairly new approach. Hence, it might be interesting also to apply this
approach to past crises such as the Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s.
4 Exploring the Common Factor
In the previous section we found strong evidence for contagion in CDS mar-
kets during the Greek debt crisis both on a national and a regional level
by applying two versions of the FR-test to rolling crisis windows. These
findings are in contrast to the conclusion of “no contagion, only interdepen-
dence” from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for equity markets after the Hong
Kong crash. We argued that one reason for this might be that the devel-
opments after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers had
demonstrated the close interconnection of financial markets with the world
economy. Accordingly, the risk of Greece becoming a new “Lehman” might
have led to contagion rather than just interdependence.
Another possible explanation might be that the so-called “common fac-
tor” between CDS markets is stronger than it is between equity markets.
Corsetti et al. (2001) argue that the strong conclusions from Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) follow “from arbitrary assumptions on the variance of the
country-specific noise in the market where the crisis originates – assumptions
that bias the test towards the null hypothesis of interdependence.”
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They use a standard factor model of stock market returns to show that
the ratio of the variance of common factors to country-specific factors has
an influence on test results for contagion. Accounting for this, they find ev-
idence of contagion for at least five countries in the case of the Hong Kong
crash. However, the bivariate correlation approach we used in the previous
section does not allow the inclusion of country-specific factors. Also, apply-
ing the framework from Corsetti et al. (2001) to our sample lies beyond the
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we think it is worth trying to get an idea
of the role of the common factor between CDS markets.
To achieve that, we perform principal component analysis (PCA) for the
regional aggregates of the CDS premia in first di!erences, i.e. we perform an
analysis to establish whether the patterns of correlations between sovereign
CDS premia of a particular aggregate can be explained in terms of a smaller
number of common factors. This analysis is motivated by Longsta! et al.
(2011). Table 5 summarizes the main results of the PCA analysis for the
whole sample (panel A) as well as the two sub-samples (panels B and C).
Like the findings of Longsta! et al. (2011), the results of the PCA analy-
sis indicate that there is a large amount of commonality in the intraregional
variation of CDS premia. When all observations are used, we find that the
first principal component captures almost half of the variation in the corre-
lation matrix of the world aggregate, i.e. when all countries are included.
This value increases to 78% in the case of the PIGS aggregate and 80% in
the case of the Asian aggregate. Furthermore, the first three principal com-
ponents collectively explain 62% of the variation in the correlation matrix
of the world aggregate. This is even higher than the 53% that Longsta! et
al. (2011) find in their analysis.
The analysis of the two sub-samples indicates that the amount of com-
monality in the intraregional variation of CDS premia is even larger when
we only focus on the period after October 20, 2009 (panel C). The first prin-
cipal component now explains between 47% (world) and 84% (PIGS) of the
variation in the correlation matrix. Similarly, the first three components
now collectively explain more than in panels A and B. For instance, the
share increases to 65% in the case of the world aggregate.
These observations indicate that the common factor plays a dominant
role in CDS markets. For interpreting the first principal component, which
might be interpreted as the common factor, we compute time series of the
first principal components for the di!erent regional aggregates. Therefore,
we take a weighted average of the daily changes in the sovereign CDS premia,
where the weight for sovereign i equals the i-th principal component weight
divided by the sum of all the principal component weights of the particular
regional aggregate. Figure 5 illustrates this by plotting the daily changes of
the CDS premia of the PIGS countries, and, in addition, the time series of
the first principal component of the PIGS aggregate.
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Table 5
Regional Aggregates - Principal Component Analysis
This table reports principal components of inner-regional CDS premia. In addition we list
correlation coe"cients of the first principal component with selected financial variables.
Cum. stands for cumulative; Stks R for the regional stock market index; Stks W for the
world stock market index; VIX for the volatility index; and CDS B for the average CDS
premium of 18 international banks. Significance of an increase of the adjusted correlation
in Panel C compared to the correlation in Panel B at the one-percent, five-percent, ten-
percent level is denoted by !!!, !!, !, respectively.
Panel A: October 1, 2008 until July 27, 2010
Principal Components Correlation of Comp1 with
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Cum. Stks R Stks W VIX CDS B
EU 0.56 0.10 0.05 0.71 -0.58 -0.45 0.37 0.69
EMU 0.63 0.08 0.05 0.77 -0.51 -0.38 0.32 0.63
PIGS 0.78 0.09 0.08 0.95 -0.50 -0.36 0.34 0.60
CEE 0.59 0.11 0.08 0.78 -0.58 -0.53 0.44 0.61
ME 0.59 0.17 0.16 0.92 -0.54 -0.56 0.46 0.56
Asia 0.80 0.07 0.05 0.92 -0.56 -0.37 0.25 0.44
LATAM 0.74 0.11 0.09 0.95 -0.65 -0.66 0.55 0.55
G3 0.57 0.26 0.18 1.00 -0.29 -0.33 0.25 0.60
World 0.46 0.10 0.06 0.62 -0.56 0.45 0.70
Panel B: October 1, 2008 until October 19, 2009
Principal Components Correlation of Comp1 with
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Cum. Stks R Stks W VIX CDS B
EU 0.56 0.11 0.04 0.71 -0.57 -0.42 0.27 0.64
EMU 0.63 0.07 0.06 0.76 -0.51 -0.38 0.23 0.57
PIGS 0.71 0.11 0.09 0.91 -0.48 -0.37 0.23 0.54
CEE 0.56 0.12 0.08 0.77 -0.55 -0.49 0.35 0.55
ME 0.61 0.16 0.15 0.92 -0.53 -0.53 0.43 0.51
Asia 0.80 0.08 0.05 0.93 -0.55 -0.37 0.23 0.41
LATAM 0.74 0.12 0.08 0.94 -0.69 -0.64 0.52 0.51
G3 0.59 0.24 0.17 1.00 -0.25 -0.30 0.18 0.58
World 0.47 0.10 0.05 0.62 -0.53 0.37 0.65
Panel C: October 20, 2009 until July 27, 2010
Principal Components Adjust. Correlation of Comp1 with
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Cum. Stks R Stks W VIX CDS B
EU 0.58 0.09 0.06 0.73 -0.63!! -0.57!! 0.48!!! 0.79!!!
EMU 0.65 0.09 0.06 0.80 -0.58!! -0.47 0.39!! 0.72!!!
PIGS 0.84 0.07 0.06 0.97 -0.58! -0.38 0.31 0.61
CEE 0.71 0.08 0.07 0.86 -0.81!!! -0.80!!! 0.71!!! 0.84!!!
ME 0.55 0.22 0.18 0.95 -0.74!!! -0.83!!! 0.75!!! 0.85!!!
Asia 0.79 0.08 0.05 0.92 -0.70!!! -0.52!! 0.41!! 0.65!!!
LATAM 0.80 0.09 0.07 0.96 -0.61 -0.91!!! 0.85!!! 0.84!!!
G3 0.54 0.28 0.18 1.00 -0.53!! -0.53!!! 0.45!!! 0.72!!!
World 0.47 0.10 0.08 0.65 -0.76!!! 0.66!!! 0.88!!!
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Figure 5: Principal Component Analysis for PIGS Countries
As can be seen, there is a large amount of commonality in the variation
within the PIGS aggregate. In addition, and for a better understanding of
the large amount of commonality within the regions, we explore the correla-
tion of the first principal component with various financial variables. These
variables are as follows:
• Index of regional stock market returns (Stks R): We construct indices
of daily regional stock market returns as an unweighted average of
daily returns of national MSCI equity market indices that belong to
the regional aggregate in question.
• Index of worldwide stock market returns (Stks W): We construct an
index of daily worldwide stock market returns as an unweighted aver-
age of daily returns of all national MSCI equity market indices in our
sample.
• U.S. equity market volatility (VIX): The volatility of the U.S. equity
market serves as a proxy for global nervousness of financial markets
and is expressed by the popular VIX index, which measures the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options.
• Index of CDS premia for international banks (CDS B): We construct
an index of daily changes in CDS premia of banks as an unweighted
average of CDS premia for 18 international banks such as Goldman
Sachs or UBS.
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The results are reported in Table 5 as well. In general, the signs of
the correlation coe"cients for the selected financial variables with the first
principal component of the regional aggregates appear intuitive and con-
sistent. For instance, a positive correlation coe"cient with the index for
bank CDS premia is intuitive: the higher the risk premia for international
banks, the higher the implicit risk for a default of one of these international
banks. This, in turn, should increase the implicit risk of negative spillovers
to the sovereign level as the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Broth-
ers has clearly demonstrated. Similarly, the higher the risk of default is on
a sovereign level the higher the risk premia for banks should be, as they are
usually heavily involved in financing the sovereign debt.
Looking at panel A, we find that the correlation of the first principal
component is generally highest with the daily changes of the index of CDS
premia for international banks when all observations are included. Moreover,
correlation is, in absolute terms, also very high for daily changes of the
regional and worldwide stock market indices. The correlation coe"cients of
the stock indices are similar to the one Longsta! et al. (2011) find for the
U.S. stock market returns. The results for the VIX index are usually lower
compared to the stock market returns. This is most apparent in the case of
the Asian aggregate, where the correlation coe"cient with the VIX index is
only at 0.25 while the correlation coe"cient with the regional stock market
returns is at -0.56.
What is more, we find that most adjusted (unconditional) correlation
coe"cients15 increase significantly if we only focus on the time period after
the debt crisis in Greece started (panel C). For instance, correlation between
the first principal component for the world aggregate and the VIX index is
now at 0.66 while it was only at 0.37 in panel B. This is more consistent with
the results from Longsta! et al. (2011), who find a correlation coe"cient of
0.659 with the VIX index.
Overall, these results indicate that the principal source of variation of the
CDS premia across the sovereigns of a particular region appears to be very
highly correlated with global financial variables such as stock market returns
and stock market volatility. These results are consistent with Longsta! et
al. (2011) and Pan and Singleton (2008) who likewise find a strong relation
between sovereign credit spreads and financial market volatility measured
in the form of the VIX index. What is more, the adjusted correlation co-
e"cients indicate that the co-movement increased significantly during the
Greek debt crisis. This may help to explain why we find evidence for con-
tagion even with the restrictive approach from Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
15We apply formula (1) to adjust for higher volatility during the Greek debt crisis.
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5 Conclusion
The recent focus of financial market participants on the fiscal situation in the
PIGS countries provided us with the possibility to study the developments of
CDS premia for “hot-spot” countries. The di"cult fiscal situation in Greece
led to a strong increase of risk premia for Greek sovereign debt as measured
in CDS premia. At the same time, CDS premia for many other countries
increased strongly as well. While the increase for Greek CDS premia was
strongest, these dramatic movements were also mirrored in the other CDS
markets.
This shows that dramatic events in one market can have strong impacts
on other markets. The question is, however, whether a high degree of co-
movement during times of crisis already constitutes contagion? The aim of
this paper was to analyze this question for the Greek debt crisis. Therefore
we discuss the theoretical framework of what contagion constitutes as well as
an empirical test procedure based on the approach from Forbes and Rigobon
(2002).
However, given the di"culty of defining a fixed crisis period, we suggest
enhancing the Forbes and Rigobon approach by applying the test on rolling
windows of periods of turmoil. We use rolling windows of relative turmoil
lasting 20, 40, and 60 days, respectively. As 20 business days are a common
proxy for a calendar month, the 20-day window corresponds with the 1-
month period of relative turmoil that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use for
testing for contagion after the Hong Kong crash in 1997. The 40-day and
60-day windows account for the long-lasting nature of the Greek debt crisis.
Our results indicate that there were periods of contagion for CDS mar-
kets during the Greek debt crisis, which is in contrast to the results from
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for equity markets after the Hong Kong crash
and their conclusion of “no contagion, only interdependence”. Especially
for European countries we would instead conclude “both contagion and in-
terdependence”. It seems that during the Greek debt crisis there were not
only periods of interdependence but also periods characterized by a signif-
icant increase in the co-movement of sovereign credit risk as measured in
CDS premia. This is especially interesting as the approach of Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) is, according to Dungey et al. (2005), a conservative test.
What is more, even Forbes and Rigobon (2002) state that their result is
“controversial”. We think that finding evidence for contagion for such a
restrictive and, hence, controversial test is a very strong result. One under-
lying reason for finding evidence for contagion for CDS markets during the
Greek debt crisis might be that the developments after the collapse of the
investment bank Lehman Brothers had demonstrated the close interconnec-
tion of financial markets and the world economy. Accordingly, the risk of
Greece becoming a new “Lehman” might have led to contagion rather than
just interdependence.
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Motivated by the regional pattern of contagion signals we found on the
national level, we also aimed at testing for contagion on a regional level.
We base our analysis on the findings from Longsta! et al. (2011), who per-
formed a cluster analysis to identify significant commonality in sovereign
credit spreads on an aggregated level. Applying the same methodology as
on the national level yields many signals for contagion on the regional level
as well. The regional pattern we found on the national level seems to be
confirmed by the regional analysis. While we get most signals for the Euro-
pean aggregates, the tests also return many signals for Central and Eastern
Europe and the Middle East. In contrast, we find almost no evidence of
contagion for Latin America and no signals at all for Asia.
Accordingly, the regional analysis supports the findings of the analysis
on the national level. Especially for Europe we again can conclude that
there was “both contagion and interdependence” stemming from the PIGS
countries. To our knowledge, testing for contagion with regional aggregates
is a fairly new approach. Hence, it might be interesting also to apply this
approach to past crises such as the Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s.
Finally, we explore the common factor by conducting a principal compo-
nent analysis. This analysis is motivated by Corsetti et al. (2001) who argue
that the strong conclusions from Forbes and Rigobon (2002) follow “from
arbitrary assumptions on the variance of the country-specific noise in the
market where the crisis originates – assumptions that bias the test towards
the null hypothesis of interdependence.”
Our results indicate that there is a large amount of commonality in
the intraregional variation of CDS premia. In addition, we find that the
principal source of variation of the CDS premia across the sovereigns of
a particular region appears to be very highly correlated with regional and
global financial variables such as stock market returns and stock market
volatility. These results are consistent with Longsta! et al. (2011) and Pan
and Singleton (2008), who likewise find a strong relation between sovereign
credit spreads and financial market volatility measured in the form of the
VIX index. What is more, the adjusted correlation coe"cients indicate that
the co-movement increased significantly during the Greek debt crisis. This
could explain why we found evidence for contagion even with the restrictive
approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
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Appendices
Approximate Critical Values for the Rolling FR-
Tests
Similar to testing for a structural break at an unknown break date, where
the so-called sup F-statistic is the largest of many F-statistics and, hence,
its distribution is not the same as an individual F-statistic, the distribu-
tion of the FR-test statistic is not the same as the standard t-distribution.
Andrews (1993) derived the asymptotic distribution for a wide class of tests
for structural change, among them the sup F-test. However, the asymp-
totic distribution of these tests is non-standard and depends both on the
number of restrictions being tested, i.e. the number of coe"cients that
are being allowed to break, and the range of the subsample over which the
F-statistics are computed. Hansen (1997) developed computationally conve-
nient approximations to the asymptotic p-value functions for the Andrews
asymptotic distributions.
Applying the approach of Andrews (1993) and Hansen (1997), respec-
tively, to the rolling FR-test approach is out of scope of this paper. Instead,
we use Monte Carlo methods to find approximate critical values for the
rolling FR-test statistics.
In order to do that we assume that the sample of daily returns are drawn
from a bivariate normal distribution. Then, for a given correlation between
the two variables, we draw a sample of the bivariate normal distribution. In
order to match the characteristics of our sample of CDS premia, we define
the non-crisis period as the first 260 observations. This should be su"cient
as Essaadi, Jouini, and Khallouli (2007) show that the minimum for a stable
rolling correlation coe"cient is 224 observations (on a five-percent level of
significance). This is illustrated by figure 6.
We then run both versions of the FR-test for the three di!erent time
windows and store the respective test statistics. We repeat this procedure
until we have collected for each of the di!erent test versions 10,000 test
statistics. Figure 7 illustrates that 10,000 observations should be su"cient
to determine stable approximate critical values.
Now, we can determine the approximate critical values for the correla-
tion structure we used for drawing the repeated samples from the bivariate
normal distribution. We do that for three di!erent levels of significance,
namelely 1, 5, and 10 percent, by using the respective percentiles of the
observed distribution of the test statistic.
Finally, we repeat this procedure for di!erent correlation coe"cients.
The results are presented in table 6.
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Table 6
Approximate Critical Values for the Rolling FR-Tests
This table shows approximate critical values for the di!erent versions of the rolling FR-test
based on Monte Carlo simulations with 10,000 repeated tests.
Panel A: ! = 0.01
FRO FRN
Correlation coe"cient 20 days 40 days 60 days 20 days 40 days 60 days
0.00 3.595 3.081 2.581 3.688 3.375 3.046
0.10 3.827 3.445 3.147 3.937 3.916 3.758
0.20 3.877 3.267 3.073 4.125 3.736 3.439
0.30 3.411 3.209 3.047 3.404 3.248 3.297
0.40 3.584 3.499 3.224 3.684 3.712 3.574
0.50 3.635 3.462 3.467 3.877 3.839 4.218
0.60 3.389 3.093 2.509 3.465 3.188 2.813
0.70 3.380 3.031 2.583 3.528 3.257 2.907
0.80 3.342 3.019 2.830 3.439 3.185 3.103
0.90 3.125 3.016 2.567 3.171 3.056 2.686
Panel B: ! = 0.05
FRO FRN
Correlation coe"cient 20 days 40 days 60 days 20 days 40 days 60 days
0.00 2.542 2.147 1.959 2.610 2.349 2.240
0.10 2.679 2.241 2.066 2.747 2.418 2.362
0.20 2.700 2.493 2.251 2.851 2.780 2.624
0.30 2.433 2.255 2.135 2.451 2.422 2.366
0.40 2.735 2.477 2.440 2.805 2.683 2.624
0.50 2.628 2.405 2.363 2.721 2.602 2.689
0.60 2.588 2.107 1.836 2.616 2.221 2.026
0.70 2.433 2.159 1.980 2.530 2.342 2.151
0.80 2.494 2.203 2.059 2.563 2.351 2.365
0.90 2.382 2.078 1.866 2.371 2.200 2.023
Panel C: ! = 0.10
FRO FRN
Correlation coe"cient 20 days 40 days 60 days 20 days 40 days 60 days
0.00 1.958 1.647 1.528 2.019 1.819 1.813
0.10 2.030 1.688 1.617 2.100 1.829 1.833
0.20 2.152 1.956 1.889 2.270 2.203 2.148
0.30 1.954 1.791 1.737 1.990 1.858 1.816
0.40 2.217 2.004 1.953 2.298 2.120 2.150
0.50 2.065 1.868 1.787 2.131 1.972 1.941
0.60 2.034 1.633 1.467 2.090 1.749 1.633
0.70 2.000 1.731 1.586 2.040 1.823 1.743
0.80 2.048 1.795 1.720 2.111 1.981 1.952
0.90 1.953 1.645 1.494 1.963 1.706 1.551
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